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Abstract. The square root is an important mathematical primitive
whose secure, efficient, distributed computation has so far not been pos-
sible. We present a solution to this problem based on Goldschmidt’s al-
gorithm. The starting point is computed by linear approximation of the
normalized input using carefully chosen coefficients. The whole algorithm
is presented in the fixed-point arithmetic framework of Catrina/Saxena
for secure computation. Experimental results demonstrate the feasibility
of our algorithm and we show applicability by using our protocol as a
building block for a secure QR-Decomposition of a rational-valued ma-
trix.
Keywords: Square Root, Fixed-Point Arithmetic, Secure Computation,
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1 Introduction
Secure Multi-Party-Computation (SMPC) is an important branch of cryptogra-
phy which enables a number of distinct entities (or parties) to securely evaluate
any function without any of them having to reveal their particular input. The
problem was first presented in [16] and (mostly) theoretically solved in ([1], [2],
[6], [9]). However due to their high complexity these protocols are unsuitable for
all but the most elementary computations.
In 2010 in [3], [4] and [5], Catrina et al. presented a framework for secure compu-
tation with fixed-point numbers. It can be used in conjunction with any linear
Secret Sharing Scheme with a multiplication protocol such as Shamir’s ([14])
and is the most versatile and practical scheme for secure computations with
non-integer numbers developed so far. We describe how it can be extended by
a protocol that securely computes the square root. It is based on Goldschmidt’s
algorithm for square root rather than Newton-Raphson iterations mainly be-
cause each iteration contains fewer dependent multiplications for virtually iden-
tical computation complexity. However, since Goldschmidt’s algorithm is not
self-correcting, the last iteration is Newton-Raphson to correct for accumulated
rounding errors ([13]). The starting point - correct up to 5.4 bits - is computed
by linear approximation.
We view our protocol not so much as a stand-alone application, but rather as
a building block for more intricate algorithms. One such application is the se-
cure computation of the QR-Decomposition of matrices, which can be used to
securely solve linear systems of equations1 and is an important building block in
many other numerical algorithms such as optimization algorithms and finding
zeroes of functions.
In section 2 we will define cryptographic primitives and terminology. In sections
3 and 4 we will describe our algorithm and its implementation. In section 5 we
will apply our algorithm to the QR-Decomposition of matrices and in section
6 we will present our experimental results. Lastly in section 7 we will draw a
conclusion.
2 Cryptographic Primitives and Definitions
The cryptographic primitive underlying our algorithms is a linear Secret Shar-
ing Scheme (LSSS), such as Shamir’s, with a multiplication protocol. Any secret
shared number x will be written with braces [x], while any public constant c
will be written without braces. To signify a secret-shared vector v we will add
an arrow:
−→
[v]. A secret-shared matrix A will be written [[A]]. All matrices - un-
less stated differently - will be assumed to be quadratic with n rows and columns.
On top of the LSSS we employ the fixed-point arithmetic presented in [3],[4]
and [5] to facilitate computations with non-integer numbers. We assume that all
numbers have total bit-length k of which f are fractional, i.e. are elements of
Q<k,f> (cf. [5]). In order to be able to represent these in a Secret Sharing Scheme
all fixed-point numbers are scaled by 2f before being secret-shared yielding the
set Z<k,f>. Any number in Z<k,f> representing x2f will be denoted by x¯. Since
secret-sharing requires a finite field we will treat Z<k,f> as if it were part of
Z/qZ for a very large q (e.g. log2 q ≈ l = 1024, k = 110). Note that because of
this no wrap-around will occur and thus computations will not be affected by
the fact that numbers are actually part of the much bigger Z/qZ. At some points
in our protocols (pseudo-)random sharings of zero (PRSZ) need to be computed.
We refer the reader to [8] for details.
We aim to develop algorithms secure in the so-called honest-but curious sce-
nario in which parties may not deviate from the protocol. In addition we only
require statistical and not information-theoretic security, i.e. the protocols can
be simulated such that the distributions of the real and the simulated view are
statistically indistinguishable ([5]).
1 This has been done already (cf. [7] and others), but only for fields with characteristic
> 0.
In the analysis of our algorithm we measure computation complexity using the
unit of one secure multiplication.
3 Mathematical Foundations
Both algorithms - Goldschmidt’s as well as Newton-Raphson’s - work by itera-
tive approximation, i.e. iteratively improving an initial estimate. They converge
quadratically: If a good initial estimate is given, the number of correct digits
doubles in every iteration.
3.1 Newton-Raphson Method
The aim of the Newton-Raphson method is to approximate the zero of a con-
tinuous, once differentiable function f . Starting with iterate x0 a new iterate is
given by (cf. [15]).
xk+1 = xk − f(xk)
f ′(xk)
(1)
We assume that the input is always greater than 0 and apply (1) to the function
f(R) = 1R2 −x, whose zero is given by 1√x . The iterating function is thus Rj+1 =
1
2 ·Rj ·
(
3− x ·R2j
)
. At the end we multiply by x and gain
√
x.
3.2 Goldschmidt’s Algorithm
If x > 0 is the number whose radicand is desired, Goldschmidt’s algorithm
([10]) iteratively computes approximations of
√
x and 1√
x
2. The description of
the software-friendly version can be seen in Fig. 1. An initial estimate y0 of
1√
x
= 1√x0 , such that
1
2
< x0 · y20 <
3
2
(2)
is assumed to be given. We set g0 = x0 ·y0 and h0 = y02 . The iterates for
√
x and
1
2
√
x
are given by gi and hi respectively. Note that the multiplications in lines 3
and 4 are independent.
2 It is actually a variation of the Newton-Raphson method described above; this can
be shown using the original definition of the algorithm shown in [13]. Thus the
convergence properties of Newton-Raphson iterations also apply here
Algorithm 1: Goldschmidt’s algorithm for square root
1 While |gi − gi−1| > ε
2 ri−1 = 12 − gi−1 · hi−1
3 gi = gi−1 · (1 + ri−1)
4 hi = hi−1 · (1 + ri−1)
Fig. 1. Goldschmidt’s algorithm for square root with starting point y0
3.3 Computation of the Starting Value
We compute the starting value by linear approximation:
L(x) = α · x+ β. (3)
Since the domain of our linear approximating function is the interval [ 12 , 1[, we
first have to normalize the input x0 to this range giving xnormal. This is done
in such a way that the resulting value is actually a very close approximation of
1√
x0
(see section 4)! To compute the coefficients α and β the idea (cf. [12]3) is
to minimize the relative error function
E(x) =
α · x+ β − 1√
x
1√
x
(4)
Differentiating E gives its maximum at xmax = − β3α . Evaluating at xmax we get
M := E(xmax) =
√
3
3
·
√
−β
α
·
2
3
· β −
√
3√
−β
α
 (5)
Plugging this back into E and solving the system
E
(
1
2
)
= −M (6)
E(1) = −M (7)
for α and β gives us the values α = −0.8099868542 and β = 1.787727479 which
allow us to compute a linear approximation to 1√
x
for 12 ≤ x < 1 with relative
error no more than 0.0222593752. This means the result is exact to almost 5.5
bits.
4 Description and Analysis of the Algorithms
We approximate 1√
x
by first normalizing the input value to the interval [ 12 , 1[
and then applying function (3) using the constants computed in section 3.3. The
final result is computed by Goldschmidt and Newton-Raphson iterations.
3 The coefficients used in [5] can be computed in a similar way.
Protocol 2: ([c], [v], [m], [w])← NormSQ([x], k, f)
1
(
[xk−1]F
8
2 , . . . , [x0]
F82
)
← BitDec([x], k, k)
2
(
[yk−1]F
8
2 , . . . , [y0]
F82
)
← PreOR
(
[xk−1]F
8
2 , . . . , [x0]
F82
)
3 foreach i ∈ [0, . . . , k − 1]do parallel
4 [yi]← BitF2MtoZQ
(
[yi]
F82
)
5 foreach i ∈ [0, . . . , k − 2]do
6 [zi]← [yi]− [yi+1]
7 [zk−1]← [yk−1]
8
−−→
[W ]← HalfIndex
(−→
[z], k
)
9 [w]←∑ k2i=0 2i · [Wi]
10 [m]←∑k−1i=0 2i · [zi]
11 [v]←∑k−1i=0 2k−i−1[zi]
12 [c]← [x][v]
13 return([c], [v], [m], [w])
Fig. 2. Modified protocol NormSQ
4.1 Norm
Protocol Norm from [5] returns values 2k−1 ≤ [c] < 2k and [v] such that [x] · [v] =
[c]. If 2m−1 ≤ [x] < 2m then [v] = [2k−m]. We modify Norm so that in addition
it also returns [m] as well as [w] = [2
m
2 ], if m is even and [w] = [2
m−1
2 ], if m
is odd. [w] is computed by sub-protocol HalfIndex, which works by rearranging
the entries of
−→
[z] and can thus be implemented without additional expense. The
modified protocol NormSQ is depicted in Fig. 2. Note that - in contrast to Norm -
we leave out computation of the sign, since we assume the radicand to be greater
than zero.
4.2 Approximation
Correctness: Let us assume that m is even. After evaluating the linear approxi-
mating function (3) we get α ·22k+β ·2k · [c]. Multiplication by [v] = [2k−m] then
yields α · 23k−m + β · 22k−m · [c]. But since [c] is nothing but the Secret-Sharing
of x¯2m · 2k = x·2
f
2m · 2k this equals4 α · 23k−m + β · 23k−m · x·2
f
2m . After truncating
5
this by 3k − 2f Bits, we get
22f−m ·
(
α+ β · x · 2
f
2m
)
, (8)
which is a linear approximation to the inverse square root of the normalized
value x·2
f
2m of [x], scaled by the factor 2
2f−m. This means equation (8) equals
4 for ease of presentation we will drop braces from here
5 we neglect rounding errors at this point; for computational reasons the order in
Protocol 3 is slightly different
Protocol 3: [w]← LinAppSQ([b], k, f)
1 α← fldk(−0.8099868542)
2 β ← fld2k(1.787727479)
3 ([c], [v], [m], [W ])← NormSQ([b], k, f)
4 [w]← α[c] + β
5 [m]← Mod2([m], dlog2 ke)
6 [w]← [w] · [W ] · [v]
7 [w]← DivConst
(
[w], 2
f
2
)
8 [w]← TruncPr ([w], 3k, 3k − 2f)
9 [w]← (1− [m]) · [w] · 2f + (√2 · 2f) · [m] · [w]
10 [w]← TruncPr([w], k, f)
11 return [w]
Fig. 3. Linear approximation of 1√
x
K · 22f−m · 1√
x·2f
2m
=
2
3f
2
2
m
2
·K · 1√
x
, (9)
where K is factor very close to 1, determined by the approximation. Multipli-
cation by [W ] = 2
m
2 and division by 2
f
2 thus yields an approximation to 1√
x
scaled by 2f which is just what is needed. If m is odd (to distinguish between
even and odd we employ the protocol Mod2 from [3]), function NormSQ returns
[W ] = 2
m−1
2 . Thus multiplication by [W ] · 2− f2 only gives K · 1√
2
· 1√
x
. In this
case we thus subsequently multiply the equation by
√
2 and get the desired result.
Complexity: The cost is dominated by the protocol NormSQ and - to a lesser
degree - by the protocol TruncPr([w], 3k, 3k − 2f). All other steps only add a
small constant number of multiplications. The complexity of LinAppSQ can be
seen in Table 1.
4.3 Goldschmidt’s Algorithm
Given an approximation [y0] that fulfills the requirement (2) all we we have left
to do is turn Algorithm 1 into a Secure Multi-Party Algorithm (Fig. 4).
In contrast to Algorithm 1 the number of iterations is fixed at θ =
⌈
log2
(
k
5.4
)⌉
which ensures accuracy to k bits. We have replaced the last iteration (lines
19-23) by a Newton-Raphson iteration, because - in contrast to a Goldschmidt
Protocol 4: [g]← SQR([x], k, f)
1 θ ← ⌈log2 ( k5.4)⌉ 16 [r]← 32 · 2f − [gh]
2 [y0]← LinAppSQ([x], k, f) 17 [h]← [h] · [r]
3 [g0]← [y0] · [x] 18 [h]←TruncPr([h], k, f)
4 [g0]← TruncPr([g0], k, f) 19 [H]← (2 · [h])2
5 [h0]← DivConst([g0], 2) 20 [H]← [H] · [x]
6 [gh]← [g0] · [h0] 21 [H]←
(
3 · 22f)− [H]
7 [gh]← TruncPr([gh], k, f) 22 [H]← [h] · [H]
8 For i = 1, . . . , θ − 2 23 [g]← [H] · [x]
9 [r]← 3
2
· 2f − [gh] 24 [g]← DivConst([g], 2)
10 [g]← [g] · [r] 25 [g]← TruncPr([g],4k,4f)
11 [h]← [h] · [r] 26 return([g])
12 [g]←TruncPr([g], k, f)
13 [h]←TruncPr([h], k, f)
14 [gh]← [g] · [h]
15 [gh]←TruncPr([gh], k, f)
Fig. 4. Goldschmidt’s square root algorithm for SMPC
iteration - it is self-correcting and accumulated errors can be eliminated6 ([13],
except perhaps for the last bit which may be wrong due to the inexactness
of probabilistic rounding). Since [g] and [gh] are no longer needed at this point,
their computation is omitted in the last Goldschmidt iteration (lines 16-18). Note
that computation (and truncation) of [g] and [h] in the loop can be parallelized.
Complexity again can be read off from Table 1.
4.4 Security
All our protocols consist of building blocks that have been proven secure either
perfect or statistical ([3],[4],[5]). No information is revealed in our additional pro-
tocols. All counters are public parameters and thus do not leak any information.
We conclude our protocols are secure in the honest-but-curious scenario.
5 Application to QR-Decomposition
The QR-Decomposition of a matrix is an important numerical primitive, that
can be used to solve linear systems of equations and is part of many numerical
algorithms. For any matrix A, the goal is to compute an orthogonal matrix Q
and an upper-triangular matrix R such that Q ·R = A. For details see [11].
6 Due to accumulated rounding errors it is theoretically possible that the result after
the last Goldschmidt iteration has less than k
2
correct bits, and thus one Newton-
Raphson iteration might not suffice to eliminate them. However this did not occur
once in our experiments. See section 6.2 for more details.
Secure Multiplications Rounds Field
LinAppSqr 10 k
2
+ l + 9 Zq
7k + 1 7 Zq1
2k2 − 2k + kl l + 1 F28
SQR 6θ + 11 k
2
+ l + 4θ + 14 Zq
3f · (θ + 1) + 7k + 1 2θ + 9 Zq1
2k2 − 2k + kl l + 1 F28
House 6θ + 15 k
2
+ l + 4θ + 17 Zq
8k + 4f + 3θf 2θ + 10 Zq1
2k2 + kl − 4 l + 1 F28
Pre-Mult-House 2n2 + 3n+ 3θ + 9 l + 3θ + 13 Zq
k · (2θ + 6) + nf · (n+ 2)− 1 12 Zq1
2k2 + kl 2l + 2 F28
QRDecomp O(n3 + θn) (n− 1) · ( k
2
+ 2l + 7θ + 30
)
Zq
O(n3f + θkn) (n− 1) · (2θ + 22) Zq1
O(+kln+ k2n) 3(n− 1) · (l + 1) F28
Table 1. Complexity of the protocols. The bit-length of k is assumed to be a power of
2, e.g. k = 2l. All vectors are assumed to be of length n and all matrices are assumed
to be quadratic with n rows and n columns.
5.1 Secure Computation of the QR-Decomposition
We compute the QR-Decomposition by the sequential application of Householder-
Matrices. Each such Householder-Matrix is responsible for computing one col-
umn of R. Their product forms Q. To compute a Householder-Matrix one first
needs to compute the Householder-Vector
−→˜
v from the respective column −→v .
The Householder-Matrix P is then defined by P =
(
Id− 2 · v˜v˜tv˜tv˜
)
. The secure
version of the algorithm used to compute the Householder-Vector
−→˜
v from a
vector −→v is based on the one described in [11], but differs in that the first com-
ponent is not normalized to one which saves one division. It can be seen in Fig. 5.
We assume the vector to be non-zero.7 In steps 1-3 the norm of the input-vector
is computed using the routine described in [3] that reduces the cost of the inner-
product to one secure multiplication. Protocol SQR is utilized in step 3. In step
5 the sign of [x1] is computed. Steps 1-3 and 4-5 can be parallelized.
5.2 Multiplication with a Householder-Matrix
If a secret-shared Householder-Vector
−→
[v] and a matrix [[A]] are given, the al-
gorithm for Pre-Multiplication of [[A]] by the respective Householder-Matrix is
7 This condition could be checked prior to the computation, but this should rarely be
necessary. For
−→
[x] = 0 the respective Householder-Vector is not defined
Protocol 5:
−→
[v]←House
(−→
[x], n
)
1 [µ]← Inner
(−→
[x],
−→
[x]
)
2 [µ]← TruncPr([µ], k, f)
3 [µ]← SQR([µ], k, f)
4
−→
[v]← −→[x]
5 [σ]← 1− 2 · LTZ([x1], k) \\σ = [sign([x1])]
6 [β]← [x1] + [σ] · [µ]
7 [v0]← [β]
8 return
−→
[v]
Fig. 5. Computation of a Householder-Vector
Protocol 6: [[A]]← Pre-Mult-House
(
[[A]],
−→
[v],m, n
)
1 [v˜]← Inner
(−→
[v],
−→
[v]
)
2 [v˜]← TruncPr([v˜], k, f)
3 [β]← −2 · DivNR(1, [v˜], k, f)
4
−→˜
[v]← Matrix-Mult-Vector([[A]]t,−→[v])
5
−→
[w]← [β] ·
−→˜
[v]
6
−→
[w]← TruncPr(−→[w], 2k, 2f)
7 [[V ]]← Matrix-Matrix-Multiply
(−→
[v],
−→
[w]t)
)
8 [[V ]]← TruncPr([[V ]], 3k, 3f)
9 [[A]]← [[A]] + [[V ]]
10 return [[A]]
Fig. 6. Pre-Multiplication of A by the Householder-Matrix determined by the House-
holder vector
−→
[v]
described in Fig. 6. Correctness can be easily verified using the equation in sec-
tion 5.1. Post-Multiplication is only slightly different.
5.3 Computation of the QR-Decomposition
With these tools it is easy to describe the QR-Decomposition based on Householder-
Multiplications (Fig. 7). The matrix R is saved in the upper-triangular part,
while the Householder-Vectors - except for the first component, which is stored
in an additional vector [δ] - are stored below the diagonal. If necessary the matrix
Q can then be computed by repeated application of protocol 6.
Protocol 7:
(
[[A]],
−→
[δ]
)
← QR ([[A]], n)
1 For (j = 1, . . . , n− 1)
2
−−−−−→
[v(j : n)]← House
(−−−−−−−−→
[A(j : n, j)], n− j + 1
)
3 [[A(j : n, j : n)]]← Pre-Mult-House
(
[[A(j : n, j : n)]],
−−−−−→
[v(j : n)], n− j, n− j
)
4 If (j < n)
5 [[A(j + 1 : n, j)]]← −−−−−−−−−→[v(j + 1 : m)]
6 [δj ]← [v1]
7 return
(
[[A]],
−→
[δ]
)
Fig. 7. Secure Computation of the QR-Decomposition of a square matrix using
Householder-Matrices
6 Experimental Results
6.1 The Setup
All protocols were tested with an underlying (5,2) Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme.
In contrast to ”real” Multi-Party-Computations all computations were performed
on one machine so network-latency is not included in the computation times.
We tested our protocols using our own C++-implementation of the fixed-point
arithmetic from [3], [4] and [5]. For computations with very large numbers we
employed the GNU MP 5.0.2. The machine was running Linux Mint 10 with an
Athlon II Quad-Core CPU @2.6GHz and 4GB RAM.
6.2 Computation of the Square Root
In our experiments we computed 8 square roots from numbers a = 0.008585937,
b = 0.146234375, c = 0.6326875, d = 11.19, e = 197.04, f = 3110.4, g =
489, 291.776, h = 3, 701, 997.568. Since in our protocol numbers are normal-
ized first, the size of the number should matter less than how close or how far a
number 2k−1 ≤ s < 2k, s ∈ {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h} is to the respective 2k and 2k−1.
Care was taken that the numbers are evenly distributed, i.e. irrespective of size
there is one number for each eighth of the interval [2k−1, 2k[. We used fixed-point
numbers with 110 bits of which 80 were fractional. The absolute value of the ab-
solute error (the difference between the exact result and the computed result)
was always less than 2−80, i.e. exact in our fixed-point setting. Computation
times were ≈ 4.89s (≈ 0.98s per player) for all numbers. One full Goldschmidt
iteration took about 0.57s (≈ 0.114s p.p.) to compute (the abbreviated one took
0.19s (≈ 0.038s p.p.)). What stands out is that the Newton-Raphson iteration
at the end at about 0.19s p.p. was more than 60% more expensive! Even though
communication did not actually take place, this is remarkable and vindicates
our decision to use Goldschmidt iterations for all but one iteration. Figures for
average precision gained from testing our algorithm on 1400 random numbers
can be seen in Table 2.
x a b c d e f g h
abs. error < 2−81 < 2−82 < 2−81 < 2−82 < 2−81 < 2−80 < 2−81 < 2−82
rel. error < 2−78 < 2−81 < 2−81 < 2−84 < 2−85 < 2−86 < 2−90 < 2−93
Table 2. Exactness for computation of the square root
6.3 Computation of the QR-Decomposition
We tested our secure implementation of the QR-Decomposition on a symmetric
positive definite 3× 3-matrix A and a random 5× 5-matrix B. To quantify the
exactness of our results (Q˜, R˜) we compared them to the exact ones using the
Frobenius-Norm:
‖A‖F :=
√√√√ n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a2ij (10)
The results can be found in Table 3. Note that the Frobenius-Norm is just one of
a number of (equivalent) matrix-norms. Using another norm could yield slightly
smaller or bigger numbers.
Matrix A B
‖Q˜‖F − ‖Q‖F 4.7 · 10−20 ≈ 1.6 · 10−24
‖R˜‖F − ‖R‖F 3.2 · 10−14 ≈ 7 · 10−12
‖Q˜ · R˜‖F − ‖A,B‖F 3.1 · 10−14 ≈ 7 · 10−12
Table 3. Experimental results of the QR-Decomposition
7 Conclusion and further work
We have for the first time described a practical way to securely compute the
square root of a shared value. We have demonstrated the feasibility of our ap-
proach experimentally and applied it to the QR-Decomposition of a square-
matrix which can be used to securely solve linear systems of equations and can
serve as a building block for many other numerical algorithms.
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